Abstract.``Subset voting'' denotes a choice situation where one ®xed set of choice alternatives (candidates, products) is oered to a group of decision makers, each of whom is requested to pick a subset containing any number of alternatives. In the context of subset voting we merge three choice paradigms,``approval voting``from political science, the``weak utility model'' from mathematical psychology, and``social welfare orderings'' from social choice theory. We use a probabilistic choice model proposed by Falmagne and Regenwetter (1996) built upon the notion that each voter has a personal ranking of the alternatives and chooses a subset at the top of the ranking. Using an extension of Sen's (1966) theorem about value restriction, we provide necessary and sucient conditions for this empirically testable choice model to yield a social welfare ordering. Furthermore, we develop a method to compute Borda scores and Condorcet winners from subset choice probabilities. The technique is illustrated on an election of the Mathematical Association of America (Brams, 1988) .
Introduction
In an election there are many ways of tallying choices so as to determine one or more election winners (Levin and Nalebu, 1995; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984) . Among them, approval voting (AV) is particularly interesting, especially in political science. Under AV each candidate that a voter approves of scores a point 1 . If there are k alternatives to be elected then the k candidates with the highest AV scores are the winners. Soc Choice Welfare (1998) 15: 423±443 For instance, Sen's (1966) value restriction is a sucient condition for social choice to be transitive and is restated here in probabilistic terms. In the case of three candidates, the choice model yields a unique probability distribution on the latent preference rankings underlying the choices if and only if our probabilistic version of Sen's value restriction holds.
However, we may have transitivity also when more than one solution exists for the distribution of preferences underlying the size-independent model, even though Sen's value restriction would not hold. In order to account for possible transitivities in settings where value restriction is violated, we provide new results that generalize Sen's theorem in terms of net preference probabilities (for related concepts, see Feld and Grofman, 1986; Gaertner and Heinecke, 1978) . This generalization involves two observable properties that are together necessary and sucient for the existence of a social welfare ordering for a given probability distribution on rankings. The two conditions are called net value restriction and net preference majority, respectively, and are weaker than Sen's value restriction condition.
When the size-independent model is satis®ed by a set of subset choice data, then we can use the latent probability distributions on rankings that are compatible with those data to check whether a transitive social welfare order exists. The latter exists if either of the two conditions above is satis®ed. Moreover, even when no social welfare ordering exists, the size-independent model allows us to check for a Condorcet winner. Furthermore, we oer a model based analytical solution to compute Borda scores directly from the subset choice probabilities. The estimated social welfare order and the estimated ordering according to Borda scores can both be compared with the ordering induced by the AV scores. This allows us to evaluate the performance of AV as a social choice mechanism.
We illustrate our technique on a data set 2 from an election of the Mathematical Association of America (see Brams, 1988; Brams and Fishburn, 1992) . On this data set we show that the conditions for the size-independent model hold, we check for the existence of a social welfare order and/ or Condorcet candidates, and we compute the Borda scores. The estimated social welfare order is not unique, while the ordering according to Borda scores turns out to match the ordering derived from the AV scores. An empirical companion paper (Regenwetter and Grofman, in press) systematically and successfully applies the tools of the present paper to several election data sets from various sources.
A size-independent model of subset voting
Throughout the paper, a weak order is a transitive, connected binary relation, a strict weak order is a negatively transitive, asymmetric binary relation and a (strict) linear order is a transitive, asymmetric and weakly connected binary relation (c.f. Roberts, 1979) .
Notation. Let II denote the set of all linear orders on C f1Y 2Y F F F Y xg with x ! 3. In some cases, x is explicitly assumed to be equal to three. We denote by C any subset of C, and for any subset of C, we write P for the collection of all linear orders in P which rank the members of ahead of all other members of C. A glossary at the end of the paper gives an overview of the notation.
The size-independent model of subset voting of Falmagne and Regenwetter (1996) 3 assumes that the choice behavior of a voter in the population takes the form of the joint realization of three random variables: V (as in vote), R (as in ranking) and S (as in set size). Accordingly we write V Y R pY and S s, respectively, for the events that a randomly drawn voter approves of subset C; has latent linear preference order p P P; or approves of s P f0Y 1Y F F F Y xg many elements, respectively.
Because the subset chosen by the voter and the number of candidates contained in their vote are observable, the realizations of the random variables V and S are observable. Since the realizations of R are, however, unobservable, this is a latent variable, the distribution of which we would like to at least partially characterize using the observed votes. The size-independent model assumes that V S j j Â R P P X The probability that a randomly picked voter chooses the set is the product of the probability that s/he votes for as many alternatives as contains times the probability that s/he likes all candidates in better than all others. 4 Although the product form suggests a certain degree of independence between the latent preferences and the number of objects chosen, Regenwetter et al. (1996) show that the model can take into account some directionality biases, say, in a case with a single candidate from one party, and two candidates from an opposing party. They also compare the model with competing probabilistic models of subset choice.
In statistical terms this model has more parameters (namely x 3 x À 1) than the choice probabilities have degrees of freedom (namely 2
x À 1). Although this might suggest that the model is empirically vacuous, Falmagne and Regenwetter (1996) give examples of empirical constraints implied by the model. Doignon and Regenwetter (1997) show that a simple transformation of the model-compatible choice probabilities produces a 2
x À x À 1 di-mensional convex polytope in R 2 x . They have characterized the resulting approval-voting polytope for linear orders for x 5, whereas the problem remains unsolved for larger x . The so-called facet-de®ning inequalities that they derive (for x 4) all have interpretations as constraints on the probabilities over the observable subset choices.
For the case of three alternatives, Doignon and Regenwetter (1997) also derive closed form solutions for the possible distributions of R underlying V when the size-independent model holds. Writing C V Sj j , when it is well de®ned, g CfgY hi CfdY eg etc., and cde for the ranking (overfY dY eg) in which is best and e is worst, the following theorem summarizes some crucial results from Doignon and Regenwetter (1997) . Note that the ratios C can be directly estimated from the data. Theorem 1. (Doignon and Regenwetter, 1997 ) Suppose that C fY dY eg.
1)
Then the size-independent model is satis®ed if and only if for each element x P C and for each k P f1Y 2Y 3g the quantity
Cfxg 1 is nonnegative (where the second sum vanishes when k 1). 2) The quantity k x is the marginal ranking probability that R ranks alternative x at position k (this holds also when jCj b 3). 3) Given that k x ! 0 for all x and k, the possible probability distributions on the latent rankings can be computed in closed form: Writing p for R p,
where k P Â maxg hY gh hiY g hiY ming gh hiY g h hiY 1 Ã X 4) The distribution of R is unique if and only if at least one k x is equal to zero.
Note that the range of k is not a statistical con®dence interval but rather a continuum of possible closed form solutions. As Falmagne and Regenwetter (1996) show, their model naturally belongs to the class of (nonparametric) random utility models of discrete choice (Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992; BarberaÂ and Pattanaik, 1986; Falmagne, 1978; Fishburn, 1992; Heyer and NiedereÂ e, 1992; Koppen, 1995; Marley, 1990; Marschak, 1960; McFadden and Richter, 1970; Suck, 1992) . Before applying Theorem 1, we introduce further concepts.
3. Linking social choice concepts to subset voting through a probabilistic model of preferences
Stochastic transitivity
The social choice literature says that a vote is transitive if the following property holds. If candidate has a majority over d and d has a majority over e, then has a majority over e. Unless we explicitly ask the voters to perform paired comparisons, it is not quite clear what this should mean in general: No binary choices are being observed in subset voting. As we shall see, the framework of a probabilistic choice model can bridge the gap between the observable choices and the theoretical concept of transitive majorities through the intermediary of (latent) preference rankings underlying the choices.
Why do we want transitive votes? Typically we like to construct an aggregate preference relation of the voters, ideally a strict linear order or a weak order: a social welfare ordering (Arrow, 1951; Heiner and Pattanaik, 1983; Pattanaik, 1971; Sen, 1966 Sen, , 1969 Sen, , 1970 . Transitivity of votes is closely related to what the psychological choice literature calls``weak stochastic transitivity'' and to the well known``weak utility model' ' (Luce and Suppes, 1965) . This model assumes that in a binary choice paradigm each paired comparison is a Bernoulli trial with a well de®ned probability of a choice for either alternative. The following de®nition is from Luce and Suppes (1965). De®nition 1. A weak utility model is a set of binary choice probabilities for which there exists a real-valued function w over C such that
where we write p d for the probability of a choice of when versus d are being oered.
The weak utility model is equivalent 5 to weak stochastic transitivity of the binary choice probabilities, which we de®ne next.
De®nition 2. Weak stochastic transitivity of binary choice probabilities means that
A p e ! 1 2 X For a given probability distribution p U 3 p over p, we write d YdPp p for the marginal pairwise ranking probability of to be ranked ahead of d. Note that there exists a substantial literature trying to explain probabilities of (observable) binary choice by probabilities of (latent and unobserved) rankings through
Given a set of binary choice probabilities, the existence of probabilities on rankings satisfying (3) is not at all a trivial matter and is still the object of intense research (Block and Marschak, 1960; Campello de Souza, 1983; Cohen and Falmagne, 1990; Dridi, 1980; Fishburn, 1990 Fishburn, , 1992 Fishburn and Falmagne, 1989; Gilboa, 1990; Heyer and NiedereÂ e, 1989, 1992; Koppen, 1995; Marley, 1990; Marschak, 1960; McFadden and Richter, 1970; Suck, 1992) . In the probabilistic framework it is appealing and straightforward to de®ne an aggregate preference relation through:`` is aggregately preferred to d if and only if the choice probability p d ! 1 2 in the Bernoulli trial''. Such a preference relation is transitive if and only if weak stochastic transitivity holds. Thus, for probabilistic binary choice, the existence of a transitive social welfare order, weak stochastic transitivity and the weak utility model are equivalent. The function w in De®nition 1 can thus be labeled a social welfare function.
Probabilistic subset choice models oer an elegant way of de®ning transitivity also for subset voting. We call a subset vote (induced by linear orders) transitive if the underlying (theoretical) probability distribution on the strict linear orders satis®es weak stochastic transitivity (for rankings), de®ned as follows.
De®nition 3. A probability distribution on P satis®es weak stochastic transitivity ( for rankings) i the induced marginal (pairwise) ranking probabilities satisfy
A e ! 1 2 X Suppose for a moment that, for a given vote, the size-independent model holds, and that we have reconstructed a probability distribution on the linear orders from the data using the model. If this probability distribution is stochastically transitive, then we can derive a social welfare ordering from it, and call that the social welfare order of the subset vote.
Remark. It should be emphasized that the weak utility model, i.e. the concept of weak stochastic transitivity is only ordinal, and thus that the social welfare function w is unique only up to arbitrary monotonic transformations (Luce and Suppes, 1965) . We might like to think that the higher the margin of over d, the more and d are dierent. To be meaningful, this statement requires a stronger model such as the``strong utility '' model (or``Fechnerian model'' in psychophysics, e.g. Falmagne, 1985; Luce and Suppes, 1965) . Here the probability of choosing over d is a monotonic function of the dierence in utility between and d (alternatives with equal utility value are discriminated at random, with equal probability). Such a representation implies strong stochastic transitivity, i.e.
which is however not sucient. The Fechnerian model is unique only up to linear transformations, thus ratios of utilities have no meaningful interpr-etation. We do not consider models as strong as the Fechnerian model or the strict utility model (also known as the Bradley-Terry-Luce model) here. The interested reader is referred to Critchlow, Fligner, and Verducci (1991) , Falmagne (1985) or Luce and Suppes (1965) .
Condorcet winners
A second important normative concept in the social choice literature is that of the Condorcet winner, especially when there exists no social welfare order. A Condorcet candidate (also known as a majority winner) is usually de®ned as the candidate(s) (if they exist) who would get a majority against all other candidates if they were to compete pairwise (Black, 1958; Condorcet, 1785; Felsenthal et al., 1990; Young, 1986 Young, , 1988 . The Condorcet winner is the most commonly accepted normative criterion for a legitimate winner of a social choice procedure to select a single alternative.
Again, absent data on binary comparisons, we de®ne a Condorcet winner in terms of (latent and unobserved) probabilistic rankings.
De®nition 4. Given a probability on P, candidate P C is a Condorcet
This concept of a Condorcet candidate is compatible with the idea that, if the voters were indeed asked to do a paired comparison instead of a subset choice, they would choose the alternative that is ranked ahead of the other in the corresponding sampled preference order.
Value restriction
Sen's Value Restriction is a sucient condition for the existence of a transitive social welfare ordering. It actually consists of 3 conditions on triples of alternatives, often referred to as NW (``never worst''), NM (``never middle''), and NB (``never best''). Assuming that each voter has a strict linear preference order, a triple of alternatives satis®es NW i there is one alternative among the three that is never ranked worst. NM and NB are de®ned analogously. Sen's value restriction states that all triples satisfy either NW, NM, or NB. The underlying intuition is that in each triple of candidates there should be at least one about which all voters agree that s/he is not the worst (middle, best) 6 . We translate these conditions into probabilistic terms.
De®nition 5. Consider a probability on p. For any given triple of alternatives, we say that the marginal ranking probabilities induced by on that triple satisfy NW(c) i the (marginal) probability for to be ranked worst (in the triple) is zero. When NW(c) holds, is (almost surely) never worst. NM(c) and NB(c) are de®ned analogously. is (a.s.) value restricted i in each triple fxY yY zg C there exists with either NW(c), NM(c) or NB(c).
Borda winner
A fourth social choice concept is that of Borda scores (Black, 1958; Young, 1974 Young, , 1986 Young, , 1995 . The Borda winner, i.e. the candidate with the highest Borda score, is arguably the second most accepted normative criterion for the``best'' outcome of a social choice procedure to select a single alternative. We rede®ne the Borda score in probabilistic terms as follows.
De®nition 6. Given a probability on P, the Borda score B(c) of candidate is
where k is the (marginal) probability that alternative is ranked at position k. The reader may remember from Theorem 1 that k can be computed from the subset choices when the size-independent model holds. We derive a more direct computation of B(c) later. Alternatively, we may calculate Borda scores from binary preference probabilities through
The two formulas are probabilistic versions of the usual de®nition, and their equivalence is analogous to an equivalence result proven by Young (1974) linking pairwise preferences to the more familiar point counting de®nition of Borda scores.
De®nition 7. The Borda winners are the alternatives with the highest Borda score.
In sum, social welfare orders and Condorcet candidates are traditionally de®ned in terms of pairwise choices, which are observable only if the voters perform paired comparisons. Similarly, Borda winners are de®ned in terms of probabilistic preference rankings or pairwise preference probabilities. Subset voting does not provide either data on paired comparisons or preference rankings. However, we can use the subset choice data to reconstruct voter preferences through a testable choice model such as the size-independent model. We have therefore rede®ned social welfare orders and Condorcet winners in terms of preference rankings (rather than choices). This reconciles axiomatic social choice theory with empirical subset choice 7 .
A probabilistic version of Sen's theorem on value restriction
The following theorem is a variation of Sen's theorem on value restriction (Sen, 1966 (Sen, , 1969 (Sen, , 1970 , generalized to probabilistic terms.
Theorem 2. Given a probability on P consider the relations and by
If is (a.s.) value restricted, then 1) is a weak order, 2) P is a strict weak order, and This and Theorem 1 imply the following result for the special case of three candidates.
Theorem 3. Suppose that C fY dY eg and that the size-independent model of subset voting holds. Then the following are equivalent (using the notation of Theorem 1).
The distribution of R is unique. At least one of the marginal probabilities k x in (1) is zero. The probability distribution induced by R on the linear orders is (a.s.) value restricted. maxg hY gh hiY g hi ming gh hiY g h hiY 1X
This gives us an observable property on the subset choices to check whether the latent preferences are (a.s.) value restricted.
Corollary 1. Consider a subset vote with 3 candidates. If the size-independent model holds and the probability distribution is unique, then as de®ned in (5) is a weak order, in (6) is a strict weak order and, provided that
It is quite unlikely to observe data with exactly one solution for the distribution of R. As we show in Regenwetter and Grofman (in press), none of the elections analyzed there yields (a.s) value restriction. However, the latter can be readily replaced by a set of two conditions which, together, are necessary and sucient for transitivity. This is shown next.
Net preferences and the social welfare ordering
The following two de®nitions are critical throughout the rest of the paper.
De®nition 8. Given a probability on P, and denoting by p À1 the reverse order of p, the net ranking probability (net preference probability) NP (induced by ) is de®ned as
The net margins (net pairwise preference probabilities) (see also Feld e Grofman, 1988) are de®ned as x d d À d X Net marginal ranking probabilities of triples are de®ned analogously. We also write x p for x p; and x de to denote the net marginal ranking probability that is ranked before both d and e, and that d is ranked before e.
De®nition 9. Given x on P as above, de®ne welfare orderings and on C through
i.e. the relations already used in Theorem 2.
De®nition 10. Given x on P as before, for any triple fY dY eg CY
x satisfies x D x ed 0 8 x de 0Y
x satisfies xw D x ed 0 8 x de 0Y
x satisfies xf D x de 0 8 x ed 0X De®nition 11. x is marginally value restricted for the triple fxY yY zg C i there exists an element P fxY yY zg such that x satis®es NW(c) [or NB(c) or NM(c)]. If this property is satis®ed, then marginal net value restriction holds on the triple fxY yY zg. Net value restriction holds on C if marginal net value restriction holds on each triple.
Remarks. If x on P satis®es NW(c) for a triple fY dY eg C, then
Similarly, NB(c) implies either NW(d) or NW(e). Also, NM(c) means that x ed 0 thus that at most two rankings have strictly positive x values, and that NW(d) or NW(e) hold. At most three elements in fdeY edY deY deY edY edg have strictly positive net preference probabilities. Furthermore, net value restriction is weaker than value restriction:
satis®es NW(c) A x satis®es NW(c), but not conversely, satis®es NB(c) A x satis®es NB(c), but not conversely, satis®es NM(c) A x satis®es NW(c), but not conversely.
A further de®nition is required before we can state our key theorem.
De®nition 12. Given x on P as before, p P P has a net preference majority i
Similarly, for any triple fY dY eg CY de has a marginal net preference majority if
The following theorem is similar in spirit to Lemma 2 of Feld and Grofman (1986) , which unfortunately omits certain knife-edge situations caused by possible ties.
Theorem 4. as de®ned in De®nition 9 is transitive i for each triple fY dY eg C at least one of the following two conditions holds:
NP is marginally value restricted on fY dY eg and if at least one net preference is nonzero then it holds that x de 0 A x de T x ed (with possible relabelings) Ws P fdeY edY deY deY edY edg such that s has a marginal net preference majority. Similarly, is transitive i for each triple fY dY eg C at least one of the following two conditions holds: NP is marginally value restricted on fY dY eg Ws P fdeY edY deY deY edY edg such that s has a marginal net preference majority.
Proof. Transitivity holds on C if and only if transitivity holds on each triple fY dY eg in C. There is thus no loss of generality to set C fY dY eg and P fdeY edY deY deY edY edg. Recall that at most three rankings have (strictly) positive net preference probabilities.
First, suppose that none are positive, i.e. that all net ranking probabilities are zero. Then transitivity holds because all alternatives are tied, i.e. /Y C 2 and net value restriction holds (but there is no ranking with a net preference majority).
Second, suppose that exactly one net ranking probability x p is positive (i.e. four net ranking probabilities are zero). Then transitivity holds since p. Net value restriction holds, with x de 0 A x de T x ed (including possible relabelings), and p has a net preference majority.
Third, suppose that exactly two net ranking probabilities are null, w.l.o.g assume that x de Àx ed 0X Then x wd holds, and therefore also net value restriction. x de b x de A ed with a net preference majority, x de x de A fY dY eY dgY fY dY eY dY Y eY eY gY x de`x de A ed with a net preference majority; c) If x de b 0 8 x de`0 then x de b x ed A de with a net preference majority, x de`x ed A ed with a net preference majority,
where (y) is a violation of transitivity for .
x ed b x de A ed with a net preference majority, x ed`x de A de with a net preference majority,
where (z) is a violation of transitivity for .
Fourth, the only remaining possibility is that three net probabilities are positive [and the others are negative, i.e. x xyz 0 cannot occur]. There are eight such cases:
The cases (7)±(9) and (12)±(14) are all equivalent through relabeling of alternatives: Starting each time from (7), the relabeling 6 d yields (8), d 6 e yields (9), 3 d 3 e 3 yields (12), 3 e 3 d 3 yields (13), and 6 e yields (14). Similarly, (10) is equivalent to (11) through, for instance, the relabeling 6 e. We thus need to consider only (7) and (10).
If (7) holds, then net value restriction holds, e and furthermore
each of which implies transitivity for both and .
If (10) holds (and thus net value restriction is violated) we obtain transitivity if and only if one of the three rankings deY ed and de has a net preference majority: Suppose that each of the three has a net probability strictly smaller than the sum of the other two. Then fY dY dY eY eY g, a violation of transitivity. Also, if one of the three has a net probability equal to the sum of the other two, say x de x ed x de Y then fY dY dY egY fY dY dY eY Y eY eY , which both violate transitivity.
( The next Theorem oers a straightforward way to calculate the Borda scores directly from the subset choice probabilities when the size-independent model holds. Note that this applies also to large x , where the ranking probabilities themselves cannot easily be computed.
Theorem 5. Whenever the size-independent model holds the Borda scores can be estimated directly from the data, as follows:
Proof. The result is immediate from the de®nition of the Borda score and the fact that
An illustration
We illustrate our method with the analysis of a data set from an election of the Mathematical Association of America (see Brams, 1988; Brams and Fishburn, 1992) . The raw frequencies as well as the estimates of C (see Theorem 1) are reported in Table 1. As Table 2 shows, the necessary and sucient condition ( k ! 0, for the size-independent model holds here. The probability distribution induced by R on the rankings must be of the form shown in Figure 1 (the net preference probabilities are reported in parentheses). Furthermore, we derive the marginal pairwise preference probabilities and net margins, reported in Table 4 , where the value in row i column j is the probability of preferring alternative i to alternative j, with k P [0, 0.145] (the corresponding net margins are given in parentheses). As all numbers in Table 2 are nonzero, (a.s.) value restriction is violated. Thus, Corollary 1 can not be used here to guarantee transitivity. From Theorem 4 it follows, however, that an aggregate strict linear preference order in the sense of the weak utility model exists when k T 0X024. In fact, net value restriction holds regardless of the particular value of k. The following possible solutions are derivable: ed when k P (0,0.024), which has a net preference majority for ed in that case, or ed when k P (0.024,0.145], which has a net preference majority for ed when k P (0.094,0.145]. The ordering according to approval voting scores is edY i.e. the same as the social welfare order in most of the solution space. A unique Condorcet winner exists here unless k X024, in which case e and tie as Condorcet candidates 8 . The larger part of the solution space produces e as the Condorcet winner.
From Theorem 5 and the data in Table 1 we directly compute the Borda scores reported in Table 3 . The ordering according to Borda scores is ed with e the Borda winner. Recall that ed is also the ordering by approval voting scores and a likely social welfare order. This is evidence that AV would have elected a candidate who is both Condorcet and Borda.
The fact that we may end up with several possible Condorcet candidates, depending on the value of k, i.e. the particular solution of the size-independent model, may appear somewhat problematic. However, the reason for this is that the size-independent model is nonparametric, and thus very general. For a systematic analysis of several elections as well as a detailed discussion about their substantive interpretations the reader is referred to Regenwetter and Grofman (in press) where the relationships between AV score ordering, Borda score ordering and social welfare orders are studied in much detail.
Discussion
The work presented in this paper provides a method of crafting more realistic models of social choice by embedding social choice analysis into a psychological representation of preferences and choice behavior. By formulating social choice concepts in terms of a plausible and empirically testable cognitive model of individual choice behavior we take a model-based approach to the question of whether or not weak stochastic transitivity holds and whether or not a Condorcet winner exists in paradigms, where no paired comparisons are being observed. 8 Of course the meaning of the word Condorcet candidate is given by the sizeindependent model as the candidate, if s/he exists, who would have a greater 1 2 probability of being ranked ahead of any given other candidate.
Most social choice theory has proceeded in a purely axiomatic way (for an exception see, for instance, Chamberlin, Cohen and Coombs, 1984) . In contrast, there is a strong tradition in mathematical psychology to formulate descriptive models of choice behaviour in terms of empirically observable primitives, as does the weak utility model of individual binary choice (Luce and Suppes, 1965) . In combining both traditions, we believe we contribute to both literatures by showing some axiomatic underpinnings of probabilistic choice models and their empirical applications to social choice concepts.
So far we have applied the model presented here to 10 three-candidate AV elections. In 7 of these 10 instances the model satisfactorily ®t, and we were able to apply the technique to test for the existence of a Condorcet winner and a social welfare order and to compute the Borda scores. These results along with further analyses are presented and discussed in detail in an empirical companion paper (Regenwetter and Grofman, in press) .
It may seem problematic that some results so far are only applicable to three-candidate elections. The reason for this limitation is that the structure of the approval-voting polytope underlying the size-independent model becomes rather complex when there are more than three candidates and requires further study. Most social choice theoretic results in the present paper are formulated for arbitrary values of x . In particular, parametric submodels of the size-independent model allow for applications with x taking any value. Such parametrizations are still under development and a detailed application is left for later.
The main contribution of the present paper concerns the mathematical tools and the underlying research strategy. We demonstrate that it pays o to combine dierent research traditions and, in particular, to base the analysis of voting schemes on testable cognitive models of the decision making process. We also consider it useful to formulate traditional concepts encountered in social welfare in terms of such a model. By doing so, we make explicit our assumptions about what determines voting behavior. This combines the analysis of social choice theoretical properties of a voting scheme such as approval voting with an empirical test of the fundamental assumptions about the nature of voter choice. While the size-independent model may be too simple to qualify as a comprehensive model of subset choice, it serves well as a measurement instrument, the appropriateness of which we can evaluate each time we use it.
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